One could never accuse South Korean companies of lacking in vision. DSME – one of the world’s premier ship and submarine construction companies – has developed a strategy that could see brand new, long-range, highly capable submarines starting to be delivered to Australia by 2033. This date could be brought forward because they have based their schedule on that for the Collins Life Of Type Extension, which is due to start in 2026.
If an order were placed with DSME before then, then delivery of capability would be even earlier. The company takes seven years from contract signature to delivery of their latest 3,750 tonne ocean-going submarines, so if Australia gave the go-ahead next year, the first one would reach us in 2030. This strategy would eliminate the risk of a capability gap before the arrival of nuclear-powered submarines and take schedule pressure off that program. It would also allow continuity of ASC’s workforce and avoid a “valley of death” in submarine construction expertise.
However, there are several important assumptions in this calculation. The most important is that the first one, two or three submarines would be built at the company’s gigantic yard at Okpo in Korea and during this process construction would be transitioning to Osborn in Adelaide. The second is that many of the subsystems would also be Korean – though, according to their experts the U.S. AN/BYG-1 combat system could be included without schedule delay and from the first of class onwards. The further a customer moves from the current DSME Military Off The Shelf (MOTS) design, the greater the impact on schedule and risk – but that can be managed by constructing in batches.
Two important disclaimers: DSME have made their calculations entirely on public domain information and have been extremely cautious about any data relating to operational matters. Secondly, all of the intellectual property for submarines is owned by the Republic of Korea (RoK) government in the form of the Defense Acquisition Program Agency (DAPA) and that detailed discussions about exports to Australia can only take place with their knowledge and agreement.
However, as APDR has reported, the head of DAPA, Minister Donghwan Eom, visited Australia in July on a fact-finding mission to identify areas of cooperation beyond the purchase of 155mm self-propelled howitzers for the Army from Hanwha – another South Korean manufacturing giant. At that time, he indicated a very positive view of increased defence technology cooperation between the RoK and Australia. He was accompanied by several senior officials including RADM Youngkyu Jun, the head of the South Korean submarine force. That was followed by a visit of Defense Minister Lee Jong-sup in early August.
The logic is compelling: the Collins Life Of Type Extension (LOTE) is technically risky, expensive – and will only add 10 more operational years to each submarine. A new submarine will have a life of 30 years. The schedule for the LOTE is that each submarine will be out of service for two years for the hull to be cut open and for a number of major machinery items to be removed and replaced with new equipment. These include the huge main diesel engines and the electric motors. Every expert believes that this process will actually take much longer than planned – especially for the first of class, which might be out of the water for three or more years.
Major refits of submarines are always complex and fraught with risk. Near universal experience is that it is only when the submarine is pulled apart that the true scope of what needs to be fixed is discovered. New equipment has to be installed in such a way that does not compromise the noise signature of the submarine, which means new resilient mountings have to be designed, installed and tested. Similarly, a great deal of old piping and cabling has to be torn out and replaced, which is exceptionally time consuming because submarines have limited margins regarding space and weight, unlike surface ships.
Government-owned ASC has done a good job of supporting Collins – after a very rocky beginning – but it has no experience in conducting an overhaul of this magnitude and complexity. The Swedish designer, Saab Kockums, has the necessary experience but for the moment is being held at arm’s length from the process for reasons that are opaque. The cost of the LOTE is still being calculated but is likely to be several billion dollars, hence the question: does it represent value for money?
DSME have crunched the numbers and argue that a far better approach is to retire the Collins as scheduled and instead fast track a new class that would give Australia cutting edge conventional submarine capability in the early 2030s. The design that they propose is their latest generation KSS-III Batch II Dosan Ahn Changho class that contains cutting edge technologies – and which is one of the world’s most modern and quiet conventional submarines.
This is a proven design, with the first Batch 1 commissioned by the RoKN in August 2021 and another four under construction, with a sixth about to be contracted. These are three each of KSS-III Batch I and KSS-III Batch II. Some basic characteristics of Batch II, construction of which started in August last year, are:
N.B. This is the only known western conventional submarine with AIP able to fire ballistic missiles. If Australia did not require the VLS it could be omitted and replaced with additional fuel, or extra accommodation – or both.
The RAN has had a strange aversion to both Li-ion batteries and AIP. It is high time to revisit both issues. These types of batteries are now in service with the navies of the RoK and Japan, so they can be considered reasonably mature. The commercial use Li-ion technology is growing exponentially and they are now in everything from mobile phones, cars and even instruments on the international space station. They outperform traditional submarine lead acid batteries on almost every metric – and using them also removes the need for cooling and acid circulation systems.
Replacing conventional lead acid batteries with Li-ion and making no other changes doubles underwater endurance and halves recharging time. Going the next step and adding AIP is a further major increase in the number of days needed before the submarine must come close to the surface to run the diesels.
One of the RAN hang ups about AIP appears to be the trade-off between the space occupied by the system and the amount of use it will receive during a mission. To put it another way, given long transits from Freemantle to operational areas, for most of the time it would just be sitting there doing nothing. Using the same logic, one could argue that torpedo tubes are also largely unnecessary, but let’s move on.
This is another classified field, but the DSME solution appears to take up a relatively small space – perhaps less than a hull section – and is able to produce 600kW of power, putting it well ahead of rival systems. It is completely silent and is not limited by operating depth or water temperature. Korea developed this solution as an improvement over German technology that came with previous generation KSS-II submarines and is based on a methanol steam reforming approach.
If anyone is in any remaining doubt and wants to see for themselves, DSME has Land Based Test Sites (LBTS) for both the propulsion train at the Okpo shipyard and a separate one for the AIP system. There is also a full KSS-Batch 2 combat system LBTS owned and operated by the ROKN.
The submarines have six masts:
The optronic masts are from French company Safran and had been selected for the Attack class program before it was cancelled.
Speaking of which, a decision to purchase the KSS-III Batch 2 would allow Australia to recoup the almost $3 billion spent on the future submarine project, which otherwise will be totally wasted – to the anger of Australian taxpayers. In 2018, KBR won a contract to design a new construction site at Osborn; presumably this work is still valid. The huge effort put into developing an Australian industry supply chain for the Attack program is still valid and could save DSME time and effort in transitioning to a local build.
Perhaps the biggest benefit would be to use the work done by Lockheed Martin Australia developing the combat system for the Attack class. At the time of contract cancellation, the combat system was well advanced – far more so than the Naval Group platform design – and hopefully that expertise could be applied to migrating the first Korean-built submarines to a configuration much closer to the RAN’s requirements. Some compromises might be necessary, but far better to have a highly capable new submarine in the water around 2030 rather than continue down the current path, which is a slow-motion train wreck.
While the KSS-III is about 80% Korean – itself a remarkable achievement given that 30 years ago a submarine industry didn’t exist – there are overlaps with suppliers for Collins and Attack. These include but are not limited to: MTU (diesel engines); Babcock (torpedo discharge systems); and Safran (non-penetrating masts). Another factor is the skill and experience of the DSME itself, which not only manufactures and consolidates the hulls of the KSS-III Batch 2 and integrates all the equipment, but it also manufactures the VLS, torpedo tubes and AIP system.
Since the RoK started its domestic submarine program in the 1980s – at about the same time as Australia commenced Collins – DSME has delivered all nine first generation KSS-I submarines based on the German TKMS Type 209. These were followed by three of the KSS-II class – a Korean adaptation of the far newer TKMS Type 214 – leading to five of six KSS-III platforms, including all Batch II production. The other Korean supplier is industrial giant Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI).
The company has exported three submarines to Indonesia and has completed a Transfer of Technology (ToT) package that will see a further three constructed by PT PAL Surabaya. DSME has also modified, overhauled and modernised 25 submarines – including two Indonesian Type 209s. This is a volume of work on a scale greater than that of European naval shipyards – and has all been achieved in just the last 25 years.
At first glimpse, the idea of South Korea building a new generation of submarines might seem improbable. However, even a cursory objective examination of the facts shows that the idea needs to be studied – and fast. The strategy only works if the government ditches the idea that everything needs to be built locally and accepts that in the interests of time and risk reduction, starting in the RoK and migrating the project to Australia makes sense – particularly since the nation has frittered away the previous decade in a series of flip-flop decisions.
There will be at least a 20-year wait until nuclear submarines can be delivered to us via AUKUS. Deteriorating strategic circumstances make it foolish for the nation to be completely dependent on the Collins LOTE being carried out on schedule – and even if it were to succeed it would only give Australia an inadequate fleet of six platforms until at least the early 2040s. What DSME is suggesting solves several major problems simultaneously.
This financial year Australia will spend $48.6 billion on Defence – and for that huge amount receive a poor return in terms of hardware. The nuclear submarine task force has a staff of more than 200 – and growing – with some of them presumably ricocheting between Canberra, London and Washington on a semi-permanent basis.
Surely some of these resources could be far better applied by sending a dozen experts to the RoK right now for a week to see what can be achieved in this decade. There is no more time to waste. Maybe it is time to ditch old paradigms and assumptions and look instead at how one of the world’s most dynamic economies achieves such stunning results.
Well written and convincing logic. The most common criticism of a new submarine buy is having to possibly manage 3 submarine types with training, maintenance etc.
Would not having the intellectual property license be a problem down the track?
The sub has an impressive array of weapons but they are all Korean. Would there be much redesign needed for American weapons?
This is an impressive sub, but one critic has said that with the extra VLS installed, the reserve buoyancy is reduced to the 10% level, the safety margin is low, and the underwater speed is also reduced, resulting in a significant decrease in survival rate. Not sure if this is accurate (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QzgbWFoFX94)
Hopefully the defence dept will consider this submarine option.
I very much doubt that Australia will receive any of the IP for a nuclear submarine so I’m not sure why it should be an issue for this one. In any case it is owned by the government of the RoK and presumably could be negotiated. The VLS is optional. Not sure about the reserve buoyancy but will do some research.
Australia owns all of the IP for the Collins and could easily build Mk2, and it is probably the path we should have gone down to begin with. ASC were working on plans prior to the Japanese and then French debacle. The Korean option has many of the same risks of the Japanese option including the security risks – The Navy didn’t want an evolved Sōryū-class partly for that reason. It would be good for Korea, but not for Australia. A lot of the talk about nuclear submarine timeline in my view is not credible, when Britain made the decision to go nuclear in about 1957 or so, Dreadnought S101 was laid down in 1959 and commissioned in 1963. An illustration of what clarity of purpose and focus can achieve – something that has been lacking in Australian defence procurement to date, and hopefully something that can be fixed for the Nuclear Submarine or an evolved Collins if need be…
I believe the KSS type is the obvious answer to the capability gap with the Collins. The KSS was designed to operate in the waters where the R.A.N. will be operating. The R.O.K is a close ally of the U.S. so the systems will be partially if not totally compatible with systems currently in use with the R.A.N.. As long as the DOD doesn’t insist on moving the goalposts ( as with the original Collins and the Hunter Class ) and the Admirals refrain from 19th Century thinking the R.A.N. can avoid a capability gap that will occur even if every thing goes as planned with the Collins LOTE. If the present Government is serious about Defence they should be on the phone to Sth Korea right now.
I agree completely. Critics of Korean technology have probably never even visited the place.
Yes, the Australian government should do what the average Australian does when they need reliable, reasonably priced transport: buy Korean. 😉
More seriously, it make sense to acquire submarines from a nation in our region which faces the same strategic threats as Australia. While the USA has proved a loyal ally in the past, they could decide to withdraw from the Western Pacific (as the UK did), whereas Korea and Japan have no choice but remain engaged.
Relatively low cost off the shelf conventional submarines could operate alongside drones, much as the Loyal Wingman is envisaged operating with crewed aircraft. By the time any Australian nuclear submarine could be built, assuming it could, drones will make such boats as vulnerable as battleships were in WWII, when threatened by carrier aircraft.
I agree with all of that. By the 2050s when Australia starts to receive nuclear powered submarines I suspect that the underwater domain will be dominated by large numbers of relatively inexpensive UUVs.
You have written well on this subject. I have friend who has been involved with naval developments and he reported that when the Americans visited recently about AUKUS and they had a ‘none to friendly’ attitude in the meeting, very critical of the lack of infrastructure (and plans) have for future nuclear submarines and troubled about our ability to deal with the complexities. There maybe even more troubles ahead with this project.
He has also visited South Korean shipyards and was amazed at their skill and quick turnarounds on projects and the quality of the builds. Korean subs would appear to be a safe and serious option.
Thanks. I have received similar feedback regarding AUKUS discussions and the lack of any coherent plan from the Australian side regarding how to go about acquiring nuclear powered submarines. I visited Okpo in 2017 and was stunned by the capability of the place and the quality of platforms being produced.
The South Koreans perfect ship building like they do with golf swings. They have to. China is nipping at their heels.
Excellent article, i agree this is the way to go,someone tell the govt
Am not an expert on Australian politics but tyour government seems hell bent on a jobs creation scheme which seems to override common sense. I agree your logic is compelling as is the case for Nuclear submarines but however politics is a bit more complicated. They will probably go for upgrading the Collins class and end up spending more money than having purchased a brand new one from Korea.
Given your recent articles putting forward SAAB/Kockums’ A26, how does that compare with the RoK option described here? Which do you favor and why?
As much as I admire Saab Kockums, I don’t believe that they could offer a next generation submarine by 2030. If they had been contracted when they should have been in 2012 they would be delivering submarines now – but this has been allowed to drag on for so long that Defence has succeeded in their strategy of making a Swedish designed submarine unviable. I would be happy to be proven wrong. It is also my guess that Saab Kockums have been treated like dirt by Australia for so long that they are no longer as enthusiastic about this country as they once were.
Conventional boats are an obsolete platform Kym. They were obsolete when I served on the Oberons 40 years ago. They are even more obsolete now. Cannot compete with nuclear boats speed, endurance or endurance at speed. A modern SSN can carry more weapons, get somewhere away from Australia very, very quickly and stay there for much, much longer. A conventional boat also takes exactly the same time to build as an SSN (not less). So why would you want to build another one?
In a general way I agree with your comment, even though a conventional submarine with AIP and Li-ion batteries is a formidable capability. I ask everyone in favour of nuclear powered submarines this question: how do we get them before 2050?
Well Kym, the Japanese latest sub, with its fast indescretion time, and Li batteries give it the capability of greater amount of batteries, no AIP and almost complete round trip with only two recharges. This is the sort of performance needed, less is more.
Agree that it is worth studying. Which brings me back to one of my fundamental problems – why is it that the RAN/CASG (and many politicians) are so completely uninterested in looking at what other nations are doing? Surely just natural human curiosity would take people occasionally out of their comfort zone in the Anglosphere.
I wonder why it was that until a year ago all of the collective great minds in the RAN and Defence were insisting that the Attack class would be a “regionally superior” capability and that nuclear power was not needed. They also managed to spend about $3 billion in the process.
I posted a similar idea about 6 weeks ago on a news media site of building the bodies with diesel electric propulsion in Sth Korea and finish the builds here in Australia to our requirements.
Old news. Japan and Korea already have these and you can buy four for the price of one nuclear. Again, our people are out of touch!
Agree that the article has quite a bit of detail. However as an ex-submariner(Oberons) you don’t state two key facts about a conventional submarine platform Vs a nuclear submarine platform and that is endurance dived (& maximum speed dived) and how long the conventional submarine can maintain that top speed submerged. No conventional submarine platform can outperform a nuclear boat in endurance or submerged top speed and especially when you combine those two factors. That is a nuclear submarine can maintain top speed for weeks at a time (usually around 35 to 40 knots). An extremely good conventional submarine platform can approach 30 knots and maybe keep that up for a couple of hours using AIP and 30 to 40 minutes on battery power alone. Given the huge distances a submarine would need to get into a position in Asian waters to maintain any deterrent whatsoever it would take that conventional submarine (from personal experience) 3 to 4 weeks to get there, a nuclear SSN maybe a week to get to the same place. Lastly it takes exactly the same timeline to manufacture a conventional submarine as it does a nuclear boat, especially this applies if the RAN acquires an already existing and oroven design such as the Virginia block V or the RN Astute class boats. The road to aquiring the Astute class SSN would give us at least 2 SSN’S by the early 2030’s. HMS Agincourt is the last Astute class SSN to be delivered to the RN in 2026. The UK government would jump at the opportunity to keep their submarine shipyards building past 2026 by building the first two Astute boats for Australia. The next submarine building is not scheduled for the RN until the present ballistic missile boat replacement builds scheduled for the middle 2030’s. That’s our path to obtaining a Collins replacement and not building yet another obsolete conventional platform.
Thank you Robbo – that’s a very valuable contribution to the discussion. Could you please elaborate on how we could acquire Astute class submarines as BAE Systems appear to be fully loaded with work and the PWR3 reactor is out of production. Don’t get me wrong – the idea is fine (even though I have hangups on the non-proliferation front) but I keep circling back to practical issues. My interest in the Korean option is that surely we must do something – anything – rather than wait for AUKUS to produce a result for us.
The GE reactor PWR3 is not being produced “true,” Kym. However it can very easily be started up again. Indeed in the second to last Senate estimates committee defence stated that RAN personnel were at present in the UK under training on the PWR3 and associated systems. So if there wasn’t a way of transferring that knowledge to a future submarine class why teach it at all? Your information regarding Thales/BAE submarine building is also not accurate Kym. HMS Agincourt the last planned RN Astute boat is due for sea trials and delivery to RN in 2026. After that their submarine building yards have a planned hiatus until the mid 2030’s when they again start building the RN replacement submarine class for their SSBN submarines (boomers). That leaves an 8 to 10 year gap in submarine building in the UK. That’s plenty of time to build the first 2 Australian Astute boats and then build the remaining 6 or 8 in either Henderson (WA) or in SA. Kym I have exercised against US Navy nukes and tried to intercept and record Chinese and Russian boats in the Pacific. The nukes have a decided advantage over conventional boats (from experience) and I would go so far as to say if you put a conventional boat to sea against any modern nuke and you are sending that crew to their almost certain death.
My information is that the PWR3 is dead and buried because of safety concerns about the reactor design. I’ll check your comment about a production gap – again, my information is that there isn’t one, or at least not the 8-10 years that you refer to.
Agincourt and the last Astute boat delivered last year have modified PWR3’s in them supposedly a fix for the published shortcomings of the earlier boats reactors and the USN is still going ahead with latest Block V Virginia class boats so their would be no shortage of available reactors to slot into additional Astute boats. The only advantage I can see in building another conventional submarine class is cost. Not even the building time of another conventional submarine stacks up against the building time of an SSN. Both are about 6 to 7 years. More if defence procurement gets their hooks into any conventional build program as they invariably try to reinvent the wheel every time.
I’m not sure that you can take a nuclear reactor from a Virginia class and just slot it into an Astute.
I’ve heard the conventional submarine v nuclear = certain death a few times. That’s quite a number of countries that seem to be wasting tens of billions of dollars and are condemning their sailors to certain death, starting in this region with Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam and Singapore. There are plenty of exercises that seem to show the continuing viability of conventional submarines, including when the USN paid for Sweden to send HMS Gotland over for a year so that they could get some practise against a technology that they no longer produce.
This really is the way to go. We know that most of our projects run years late and way over budget, however if we were to get three or four of these built in Korea they would be delivered on time and within budget. That gives us time to ramp up building here. The reality is that we’re unlikely to get any SSNs operational until 2038 and we need these boats ASAP. By 2038 we could have eight of these in the water already. The Koreans delivered two Frigates to the Philippines early and on budget, so they have a track record of delivering on promises. If we asked they could probably parallel build two at a time. The Gov’t should go this route and get moving on at least eight of these and order another three Hobart Class now. The Hunter class are going to be late to the party. The PRC are going to be dominant and extremely aggressive by 2032 and we’re going to be caught with our pants down. While we’re at it we should upgun the OPVs.
Im sure IP rights can be negotiated as part of the formal process. If Japan can build an equivalent with VLS the have a competition to complete at end of year, otherwise just sign the contract now.
I would like to see if the methanol based AIP can be replaced by extra batteries as has been done with Soryu, and hopefully swap out the batteries with safer chemistry (eg LiFePO4 instead of common Li-ion) if hasent been done already on existing KSS-II. I would think a fleet of SSKs should be a permanent complement to any new SSN capability, and likely have the important job of patrolling the shallower seas to the north of Australia and will have the advantage of being more stealthy than nuclear subs
Thank you! That sounds like you really understand the details of AIP – which I do not. I can only repeat the on-the-record discussion with DSME where they said if Australia does not want the VLS they can easily use that part of the submarine for whatever the customer wants.
Not so Dwayne. A modern pump jet propulsion SSN is unbelievably quiet. My position was sonar on boats. The pump jets have no propellers and hence no cavitation. This makes determining “Aspect and speed” unbelievably difficult and if they become aware you even maybe in their area they can go as “ultra quiet” as any conventional boat. If you are very, very lucky you may hear their cooling pumps but even then and even with passive ranging tech they would be very close before you picked that up and in that situation they have the advantage of almost immediate superior speed to evade any weapons you may launch.
If we need new conventional submarines before SSN’s can be delivered, I favor a local evolved Collins build assisted by the US/UK if required. These boats are well understood operationally by the RAN, have good availability and are currently sustained in-country at a level of 95%. That’s a pretty solid military capability. Why throw that out for a conventionally powered alternative in KSS III that is unknown and may not be clearly better?
While it is true KSS III has AIP and Li ion batteries, the RAN have rejected both of these in the past and may well have had good reason to do so due to their unique operating requirements. If on the other hand AIP/Li ion batteries were to come into favor, there is no reason why they could not also be added to an evolved Collins. Any KSS III option would require extensive modification to support the US weapons and combat system mandated by the RAN all of which are standard on Collins.
Even if KSS III could be constructed more quickly there is also the time the RAN will take to make an unfamiliar boat an operational capability. A platform does not equal a capability. This process takes years and would likely be drawn out for an unfamiliar platform like KSS III compared to a familiar evolved Collins.
Australia needs an interim submarine capability to cover the period between the retirement of Collins and the introduction of the SSN capability. Better to evolve what we have, know and can support right now than to bring in a completely new, unknown and unproven alternative that may not actually be any better.
Do the LOTE and lets get on with it. There has already been too much chopping and changing with regards submarines which has just added to the delays. Keep the Collins till the new nuclear subs arrive, hopefully we might be able to get our first one perhaps two about or before 2030.
If it were me, I would have started to LOTE in about 2020. For the life of me I cannot understand why the RAN is dragging this out to start in 2026.
If we had done what every sub building nation has done, that is build and evolve the next version, we would be looking at Collins version 4 by now with the almost full wish list. We need to give up on subs period. Spend the same money on B-21s and sub hunter tech on our frigates. ‘Times up Gringos”
I share your profound sense of disillusionment for exactly the same reason. South Korea started their submarine program in the mid-80s at almost exactly the same time as we started Collins, with about the same budget – and look at what they have achieved.
Well children friends, today news came through that the Collins Class could receive ” Tomahawk Missiles” in the rejuvenation. This does suggest a hull modification or two, the possiblities are endless. Dont be surpised that SAAB and ASC have been busy for a while now doing what schoud have been done a long time ago.
Any further improvement in the capability of Collins is welcome. My information is that the torpedo tube launched version of Tomahawk is out of production and if the RAN really wants it we will once again be paying the US an absolute fortune.
iF we want to keep as close to Collins class as we can, we should involve Kockums again. The sub they are working on at the moment looks like it could be a good fit for the RAN. It is bigger than the Collins, with a longer range.
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Australian Defence In a Global Context. In its 47th year APDR is the longest established defence publication in Australia.
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